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ABSTRACT
The present paper investigates the effect of book-tax differences on the accounting 
conservatism (as a proxy for financial reporting quality). The major objective of this study 
was to examine the extent to which regulatory and opportunistic information in book-
tax differences influence accounting conservatism. We also aim to examine if book-tax 
differences are a signal of “bad news” for investors.  Using publicly available financial 
statements from 2005 to 2012 for 28 Tunisian listed firms on the Tunis Stock Exchange 
and operating in the industrial and commercial sectors, we use a current measure for 
accounting conservatism and documents that observation with large book-tax differences 
are associated with low levels of accounting conservatism. Also, we find that firms with 
abnormal book-tax differences and normal book-tax differences exhibit less accounting 
conservatism.  Overall, the results suggest that the total and differing components of book-
tax differences have differential implications on accounting conservatism. Our research is 
valuable for researchers, shareholders as well as regulators. For researchers, it appears to 
an innovative area for future research. For shareholders, it shows the role of the information 
transmitted by book-tax differences into the analysis of earnings quality published by firms. 
This study also helps regulators to improve accounting rules and tax rule.
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INTRODUCTION 
Famous accounting frauds, such as those witnessed to take place at Enron, 
Worldcom, Tyco and Xerox, have incited several researchers to investigate whether 
the book-tax differences (BTDs) could well serve as an indication of a potential 
“red flag” highlighting low earnings quality (Hanlon, 2005). Indeed, BTDs help 
in providing information concerning earnings quality level, while an increase in 
book-tax conformity helps improve information quality. Actually, this theme has 
constituted a subject of major concern for several scholars and drawn the interest 
of academic researchers, regulators and policymakers for almost a whole decade.
It is a well known fact that accounting information might affect taxable 
income, particularly in the presence of earnings management. Net income (profit / 
loss) is one of the most important products of accounting, but this result is sensitive 
to discretionary adjustments that have little or nothing to do with the reality of 
the firm. In fact, Revsine, Collins, Johnson and Mittelstaedt (2005) teach that 
“useful information for assessing the degree of conservatism in a firm’s portfolio 
of accounting choices can be extracted from the income tax footnote by comparing 
the ratio of pre-tax book income to taxable income”. In this regard, Mills and 
Newberry (2001) have discovered a positive relationship to persist between 
BTDs and financial reports, such as income smoothing, financial difficulties, and 
premium thresholds. In his conducted study concerning the U.S. context, Jackson 
(2015) has examined the association between BTDs and future earnings changes. 
He has discovered that earnings management appears to contribute greatly to the 
association between BTDs and future earnings changes. 
One contemporary paper by Heltzer (2009) focuses on the relationship 
between BTDs and conservatism. She examines what information, if any, BTDs 
reveal about financial statement conservatism. She finds that firm-years with a large 
positive BTDs exhibit similar conditional and unconditional financial statement 
conservatism, relative to other sample firm-years, and greater conditional and 
unconditional taxable income conservatism, relative to other sample firm-years. 
Additionally, firm-years with large negative BTDs exhibit greater unconditional 
conservatism in book income, relative to other sample firm-years, and less 
conditional and unconditional conservatism in taxable income, relative to other 
sample firm-years. However, she does not test whether firms that engage in a 
high level of tax avoidance and earnings management exhibit less accounting 
conservatism.
In this study, we extend Heltzer (2009) by investigating whether firms 
with large book-tax differences driven by earnings management, tax avoidance 
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and their interaction are associated with low accounting conservatism. We examine 
whether regulatory and opportunistic sources of total BTDs differentially influence 
accounting conservatism in the Tunisian context. We focus our study on Tunisia 
because of its unique financial reporting setting. Tunisia is considered among 
the countries with the differences between the purposes of their accounting and 
tax rules and the purposes of their accounting and tax law, since each responds 
to a different standard-setting process. This context which is characterised, by 
an accounting system which offers several discretionary ways in the choice of 
accounting methods and a tax system that gives large latitude in tax management, 
gives rise tax and accounting manipulations and following the differences in 
accounting and tax results.
This study differs from Heltzer (2009) in several ways. First, we decompose 
BTDs into normal and abnormal components. According to Tang and Firth (2012), 
normal BTDs (NBTDs) refer to the differences likely to be derived from the 
different reporting rules for book and tax purposes. Abnormal BTDs (ABTDs) 
reflect the differences that are more likely to stem from earnings management and 
tax evasion practices as well as their interaction.
Second, we include just a conditional conservatism in our accounting 
conservatism measure. Our primary measure of conservatism is Khan and 
Watts’ (2009) C-score, which is based on Basu’s (1997) timeliness measure of 
conservatism. The C-score captures both the time series and the cross-sectional 
variations in measuring individual firms’ conditional conservatism (Khan & 
Watts, 2009).  Finally, we examine whether regulatory sources of total BTDs are 
also associated with low accounting conservatism, and how BTDs represent bad 
signal information for investors and stakeholders. The present paper will focus on 
investigating the role of book-tax differences in indicating the earnings quality and 
especially accounting conservatism.
The major objective of this study was to examine the extent to which 
regulatory and opportunistic information, as impounded in book-tax differences, 
proves to influence accounting conservatism. We also aim to analyse that the book-
tax differences are a signal of “bad news” for investors. 
Using publicly available financial statements from 2005 to 2012 for 28 
Tunisian listed firms on the Tunis Stock Exchange and operating in the industrial 
and commercial sectors, we use a new measure of accounting conservatism and 
documents that firm-years with large book-tax differences are associated with 
low levels of accounting conservatism. Also, we find that firms with ABTDs and 
NBTDs exhibit less accounting conservatism.
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Therefore, this study makes a major contribution to research on BTDs 
by demonstrating their informational value to investors. Our research is valuable 
for researchers, shareholders as well as regulators. For researchers, it appears 
to an innovative area for future research. For shareholders, it shows the role of 
the information transmitted by book-tax differences into the analysis of earnings 
quality published by firms. This study also helps regulators to improve accounting 
rules and tax rules.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Prior literature has documented that BTDs are an important area in examining 
earnings quality. On the one hand, and for report elaboration purposes, financial 
statements usually communicate information useful for investors, creditors and 
other users to help them in making the best and most effective decisions. On 
the other hand, and for the sake of a more efficient earnings quality assessment, 
several researchers have tended to apply the financial statements’ contained tax 
information, mainly that reflected in BTDs (Hanlon, 2005; Lev & Nissim, 2004; 
Blaylock, Shevlin, & Wilson, 2011; Wahab & Holland, 2015). In fact, previous 
studies revealed that companies exhibiting large differences between the book 
income and the taxable one usually tend to show highly decreased persistent 
earnings, low earnings growth and remarkably high earnings management 
practices, as compared to companies with average BTDs levels. More specifically, 
Lev and Nissim (2004) exposed a significant relationship between total BTDs and 
earnings shifts. Hanlon (2005) found that firms with large temporary differences 
appear to have less persistent earnings and accruals. She showed that BTDs 
reflect a lower earnings quality of broadcast information. In addition, Blaylock 
et al. (2011) confirm well the Hanlon (2005) research finding, stating that firms 
with large positive temporary differences tend to have less persistent earnings. 
Similarly, Ayers, Laplante and McGuire (2010) have examined whether credit 
analysts use the BTDs’ transmitted information to analyse company credit risk. 
Indeed, since the book income noticeably differs from the taxable income, credit 
analysts may well be led to interpret such divergence as being an information 
quality deterioration signal. 
Financial texts most often state well that BTDs can stand as means of 
information telling investors about the earnings quality. Weber (2009) has proved 
that investors and financial analysts use the BTDs’ information when predicting 
future earnings and firm value. In turn, Phillips, Pincus and Rego (2003) have 
undertaken to evaluate the usefulness of the deferred tax expense in determining 
earnings management. Asgari and Behpouri (2014) assume that the discretionary 
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authority is more remarkable in accounting rules rather than into tax rules. Thus, 
managers usually tend to exploit this discretion to manage book income in an 
upward trend, leading to large BTDs and, subsequently, to increasing deferred tax 
expenses. Furthermore, Heltzer (2009) has noted that managerial discretion proves 
to be more involved in determining accounting earnings in respect of taxable 
income. She has also revealed the fact that whenever BTDs increase, book income 
would prove to deviate upwardly as compared to taxable income, allowing for a 
reduced accounting conservatism. 
Several studies have proposed to measure the differences between the 
book income and the taxable one through deferred tax, dubbing their temporary 
differences. Yet, total differences include the entirety of components (temporary, 
permanent, normal and abnormal), involving vast information content regarding 
information quality. In this respect, Heltzer (2009) has examined, the usefulness of 
the BTDs’ contained information to show the extent of conservatism prevailing in 
financial statements. In fact, she has shown that the relationship between BTDs and 
accounting conservatism depends highly on several factors. Indeed, she suggests 
that this relationship varies depending on the persistence of either large positive 
BTDs and/or negative ones. Firms with large positive BTDs tend to exhibit the 
same conditional and unconditional conservatism of financial statements and a 
higher level of conservatism in regard of taxable income as compared to other 
firms in the sample. In contrast, firms with large negative BTDs tend to display 
a higher conditional and unconditional conservatism on the book income and a 
lower conservatism level on taxable income in respect of other firms in the sample.
Based on the entirety of these cited findings, one may well predict that the 
BTDs’ information content appears to help largely indicate the earnings quality 
(Jackson, 2015; Huang & Wang, 2013). These differences allow us to reveal their 
importance if they change investors’ as well as financial analysts’ expectations 
concerning the firms’ future performance and its created value. Correspondingly, 
we predict that earnings are less conservative for firms with high total BTDs. Our 
first hypothesis is:
H1: Firms with high total BTDs exhibit low accounting 
conservatism.
To note, NBTDs indicate large differences persisting between accounting 
rules and tax ones. Tang and Firth (2011) noted that these differences have no 
connection with the firm managers’ opportunistic intervention. In this regard, 
Bouaziz Daoud and Ali Omri (2011a) add that normal BTDs is constituted by 
temporary and permanent differences. These are caused by the differences 
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between the fiscal rules’ objectives and those of the accounting rules. Jackson 
(2009) found that large permanent differences help reduce future net income as 
they relate to higher future tax expenses. The author adds that temporary BTDs 
are negatively associated with earnings quality. Hanlon (2005) demonstrates a 
negative association between earnings persistence and the large positive (negative) 
temporary differences. She considers that BTDs stand as “red flags” affecting 
the firm’s potential performance forecasts. This finding was confirmed by Tang 
and Firth (2012) who found a negative relationship to predominate between the 
NBTDs and future earnings on the one hand, and even a negative relationship 
between these differences and stock prices, on the other. 
Watts (2003) argues that as the link between financial and tax reporting 
increase, conservatism will also increase as departures from conservatism will have 
unfavorable tax consequences. Thus, Plesko (2004) found that, if the conservatism 
hypothesis is correct, the increase in book-tax differences suggests that the link 
between tax and financial reporting may have declined, leading to less financial 
conservatism and a relative increase in the net asset value of firms. In Romania 
context, Istrate (2011) investigated that intangible assets may be treated differently 
from the accounting and fiscal viewpoints, which also points out the differences 
between the fiscal and accounting prudence.
With respect to the Tunisian context, the subject of study, one may well 
assume that NBTDs can also inform users about poor information quality in a 
bid to help investors predict future performance and determine the accounting 
conservatism level.
Consistent with this insight, we predict that firms with high NBTDs are 
less conservative.
H2: Firms with high NBTDs exhibit low accounting conservatism.
According to Tang and Firth (2012), the discretionary component of the 
BTDs is due to discretionary practices of managers at the choice of accounting 
and tax practices. These practices are earnings management and tax management. 
Previous research has indicated that ABTDs have a negative effect on the earnings 
quality. Blaylock et al. (2011) found a negative relationship between ABTDs 
and earnings persistence. In addition, Ayers et al. (2010) question about the 
relative information in taxable income versus book income. The authors extend 
Hanlon, Laplante and Shevlin (2005) and document that taxable income has 
more incremental information relative to book when tax planning is less likely 
and earnings management is more likely. Contrary to Ayers et al. (2010), Chen, 
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Dhaliwal and Trombley (2012) discovered that the taxable income has less 
incremental information when earnings management is more likely. For this reason, 
Tang and Firth (2012) have considered that the information content of ABTDs 
is relevant. The authors have shown a significantly negative association between 
ABTDs and earnings persistence and earnings-returns. Heltzer (2009) examines 
that the variations in book-tax differences reveal information about variations 
in financial statement conservatism. In their additional test, Heltzer (2009) uses 
discretionary book-tax differences to provide insights into the causes of book-tax 
differences. Their findings suggest that large positive book-tax differences are not, 
on average, caused by aggressive book reporting, but may be caused by aggressive 
tax reporting. Their results also suggest that large negative book-tax differences 
may be the result of the smoothing of both book income and taxable income. Their 
additional tests involving discretionary book-tax differences support these notions.
The achieved results indicate that firms with large positive discretionary 
differences usually tend to exhibit a greater conditional and unconditional 
conservatism in taxable income as well as a similar conditional and unconditional 
conservatism in regard to book income. Heltzer (2009) means that the relation 
between tax and conservatism is stronger when firms’ reported income is more 
conform to its taxable income.
Overall, there seems to be some evidence to indicate that ABTDs affect 
negatively accounting conservatism.
As discussed previously, ABTDs reflect a high level of opportunistic book 
and tax reporting. We predict that ABTDs deteriorate accounting conservatism. 
Our third hypothesis is as follows:
H3: Firms with high ABTDs exhibit low accounting conservatism.
METHODOLOGY 
Sample Selection and Data
The initial obtained sample contains 77 Tunisian firms listed on the Tunisian’s 
Stock Exchange (TSE) during eight years ranging from 2005 to 2012. This choice 
is justified by the need to provide a favourable framework to study the relation 
between BTDs and accounting conservatism and by the choice of study variables 
(including accounting conservatism). From the initial sample, we have eliminated 
firstly the financial firms. This exclusion is justified by the fact that they are 
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governed by a special legislation in the preparation of their financial statements 
and by specific sector accounting standards. Secondly, we have chosen to remove 
firms with missing necessary data to work on a balanced panel. Hence, 28 firms 
and 224 observations remain in our sample (Table 1).
The listed companies’ relevant data are collected from published financial 
statements on the Tunisian stock exchange and Financial Market Council.
Table 1
Sample selection
Sample Number of firms
Initial sample 77
Financial firms                            (47)
Firms with insufficient data  (2)
Final sample 28
Duration of study 8
Total observations 224
Sector Firms (2005–2012)
Industrial sector
   Agro-food industry 32
   Construction material 48
   Chemicals 40
   Various industry 16
   Total industrial firms 136
Commercial sector
  Total commercial firms 32
Service sector
  Total service firms 56
  Total firms-years 224
Variables Measurement
Accounting conservatism
In the present study, the dependent variable is accounting conservatism. There is no 
single accepted measure of accounting conservatism in the accounting literature. 
In order to measure the conservatism in each firm-year, we adopt the model of 
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Khan and Watts (2009), based on Basu (1997). Based on the model developed by 
Basu (1997), Khan and Watts (2009) have added that conservatism constitutes a 
linear function of the market-to-book ratio, size and leverage of the annual cross-
sectional Basu (1997) regression, the C-score is able to take into account both firm 
and year variation in conservatism. The model of Basu (1997) can be written as: 
P
X
D R R D
,
,
,
i t
i t
it it it it i t
1
0 1 2 3b b b b f= + + + +
-
6 6 6@ @ @   (1)
where Xi,t is the earnings per share for firm i in fiscal year t, Pi,t-1  is the price per 
share at the beginning of the fiscal year, Rit is the return on the firm i over the 
period nine months before fiscal year-end t to three months after fiscal year-end t, 
Dit is a dummy variable equal to 1 when Rit < 0 and equal to 0 otherwise and εi,t is 
the residual. The good news timeliness measure is β2. The measure of incremental 
timeliness for bad news over good news, or conservatism, is β3 and the total bad 
news timeliness is β2 + β3.
Watts (2003) suggests that conservatism varies with four factors: contracts 
(including debt and compensation contracts), litigation, taxation and regulation. 
Previous research (eg, Watts, 2003; Guay, 2008; Zhang, 2008; Gao, 2013) has 
documented the role of debt covenants and conservative financial accounting in 
addressing agency conflicts between lenders and borrowers.
Khan and Watts (2009) introduced in the Basu model the following 
variables: the market-to-book ratio; firm size; and firm leverage in order to 
generate “C-Score”, which estimates the level of conservatism. Khan and Watts 
(2009) find that conservatism is a linear function of the Market-to-Book Ratio, size 
and leverage. The specifications of C-Score are:
C-SCOREit = β3 =λ0+ λ1 (SIZE) it + λ2 (M/B) it + λ3 (LEV) it (2)
where SIZE: stands for the natural log of equity market value; M/B: represents the 
market-to-book ratio and LEV: is leverage, defined as long-term and short term-
debt, deflated by equity market value.
Replacing β3 in Equation (1) by Equation (2) yields the following empirical 
regression model: 
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To estimate the level of conservatism concerning each company, we adopt 
the following approach Gao (2013), Francis, Hasan and Wu (2013), and André, 
Filip and Marmousez (2014): We begin by estimating λi, i = 0 to 3 in Equation (3), 
then we introduce the estimated parameters in the Equation (2) of C-Score. We 
interpret a higher value of C-Scoreit as accounting information with a higher level 
of conservatism.
Total book-tax differences
Following most of the conducted researches (e.g., Manzon & Plesko, 2002; Ayers 
et al., 2010; Frank, Lynch & Rego, 2009; Wilson, 2009; Dhaliwal, Huber, Lee, 
& Pincus, 2008; Desai & Dharmapala, 2006; Hanlon et al., 2005; Moore, 2012; 
Hanlon, Krishnan, & Mills, 2012; Tang, 2015), BTD is the spread between pre-
tax book income and taxable income. Taxable income is estimated by the rapport 
between the current tax expense and the tax rate.
Estimating NBTDs and ABTDs
Manzon and Plesko (2002) conducted an investigation of the major differences 
noticeable between book income and the taxable one. Actually, they identify four 
activity types likely to affect book-tax income spread namely: 1) demand controls 
for tax favored investment and financing action, 2) direct investment sources’ 
related timing differences, 3) permanent differences and 4) noise factors. Graham, 
Raedy and Shackelford (2012) found that the determinants of BTDs include tax 
planning, earnings management, general business conditions, changes in financial 
accounting rules, changes in firm-level sales and the level of property, plant and 
equipment in a given firm. In this study, we adopt the approach developed by Tang 
and Firth (2011) and isolate the BTD information related to regulatory differences 
and the BTD information related to opportunistic differences. They regress total 
BTDs on non discretionary items that are known to cause NBTDs but are less 
likely to reflect earnings or tax manipulations. These items are changes in sales, 
gross property, plant and equipment, non-goodwill intangible assets, net operating 
loss and tax rate differences.
In this study, we use factors related to differences in Tunisian tax and 
accounting rules to explain non discretionary differences. We regress total book-
tax differences on factors of changes in sales, gross property plant and equipment, 
profitability and lagged BTDs.
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The estimation equation is:
BTDs REV PROF INV LagBTDit it it it it it0 1 2 3 4T Tb b b b b f= + + + + +  (4)
where
BTDit = total book-tax differences for the firm i in year t obtained from the 
difference between pretax book income and taxable income; 
∆REVit = the change in revenue from year t-1 to year t; 
∆INVit = the change in investment in gross property, plant and equipment from 
year t-1 to year t;
PROFit = a binary variable equal to one if the firm reports positive pre-tax 
income and zero otherwise;
LagBTDs = reported book-tax differences in year t-1.
∆REV is used to capture the effect of economic growth on NBTDs. In 
Tunisian context, sales growth may well lead to enormous credit losses. In 
financial reporting, these receivables are immediately recognised to stand as 
losses. Consequently, they lead to reducing the annual income and, subsequently, 
reducing the income tax expenses. Inversely, however, during tax reporting, these 
receivables are deductible from the taxable amount, providing certain conditions 
are met. Such treatment differences may likely will create remarkable non 
discretionary differences between the book-income and the taxable one.
∆INV is used to capture of the growth in investment on NBTDs. According 
to the Tunisian accounting standard, the observation of tangible fixed assets’ 
depreciation is mandatory. At tax level, however, no deduction is allowed, which 
involves negative differences between the accounting income and the taxable one. 
In this regard, Manzon and Plesko (2002) found a positive relationship to prevail 
between investment growth and BTDs. Tang and Firth (2011) apply this variable 
to capture the investment scale growth effect on BTDs relating to mechanical 
depreciation and amortisation. They claim that investment growth is likely to help 
increase the provision for fixed and intangible assets’ impairment provisions in the 
income statement appear as required under existing accounting standards.
PROF: Manzon and Plesko (2002) found that profitable companies can 
effectively apply the tax deductions and tax credits to benefit from tax exemptions. 
Indeed, in beneficiary firms, managers usually appeal to these tax benefits in a bid 
to reduce the amount of taxable incomes; thus, increasing the differences between 
book income and tax income (Sodan, 2012).
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LagBTDs: This variable stands as a noise factor with a positive effect on 
the level of differences between the book income and the taxable income Manzon 
and Plesko (2002).
To control for firm size, all variables are scaled by average total assets at 
year t except for PROF. NBTDs are the fitted values from Equation (4) and the 
residuals are ABTDs.
Control variables
We add other variables in regression to control for performance, size, sales growth, 
and growth opportunities. Previous researches suggest a negative association 
between performance and accounting conservatism. Ahmed, Billings, Morton and 
Stanford-Harris (2002) argue that the mechanical, negative association between 
accounting conservatism and ROA dominates the positive association between 
accounting conservatism and profitability. We expect a negative relationship 
between ROA and accounting conservatism. Khan and Watts (2009) suggest that 
small firms exhibit high accounting conservatism level than large firms. Watts and 
Zimmerman (1986) propose that large firms have high political costs, resulting in 
high accounting conservatism. We include also leverage to control for the effect of 
bondholder-shareholder conflicts over dividend policy on accounting conservatism 
(Ahmed et al., 2002).
Table 2
Statutory variables definitions and measurements
Variables Symbols Measures Authors
Dependent variable
Accounting 
conservatism
C-Score The level of conservatism of 
firm i in year t measured by 
the model of Khan and Watts 
(2009).
Khan and Watts (2009), Gao 
(2013), Francis et al. (2013), 
Jarboui (2013), André et al. 
(2014).
Independent variables
Book-tax differences BTDs The difference between pretax 
book income and taxable 
income.
Manzon and Plesko (2002) , 
Ayers et al. (2010), Dhaliwal 
et al. (2008), Desai and 
Dharmapala, (2006) Hanlon 
et al. (2005) Moore, (2012), 
Hanlon et al. (2012)
Normal book-tax 
differences
NBTDs Represent the estimated values, 
in cross sections, of the BTDs’ 
corresponding equation (4)
Tang and Firth (2012)
(continued on next page)
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Variables Symbols Measures Authors
Abnormal book-tax 
differences
ABTDs The residual estimated from 
equation (4)
(The difference between BTDs 
and ABTDs).
Tang and Firth (2012)
Control variables
Returns on asset ROA The ratio of earnings per share 
to total assets
Khan and Watts (2009)
Size SIZE Ln (total assets) Khan and Watts (2009)
Watts and  Zimmerman (1986)
Leverage LEV Total debts/total assets Ahmed et al. (2002),
Dichev and  Skinner (2002), 
DeFond and  Jiambalvo 
(1994), 
Zmijewski and Hagerman 
(1981)
 Growth 
opportunities 
∆REV Calculated in terms of current 
year net sales, as reported on 
the income statement, minus the 
previous year net sales.
Ahmed et al. (2002)
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
We examine how different sources of BTDs affect the level of accounting 
conservatism. We estimate the following models: 
C-scoreit = α0 + α1BTDsit + α2ROAit + α3SIZEit + α4LEVit + α5∆REVit + εit  (5)
C-scoreit = α0 + α1NBTDsit + α2ROAit + α3SIZEit + α4LEVit + α5∆REVit + εit  (6)
C-scoreit = α0 + α1ABTDsit + α2ROAit + α3SIZEit + α4LEVit + α5∆REVit + εit (7)
where C-scoreit designates the conservatism level of the firm i in year t; 
BTD reported book-tax differences in year t; NBTDs represent the estimated values, 
in cross sections, of the BTDs’ corresponding equation; ABTDs are calculated by 
determining the difference between total BTDs and NBTDs; ROA is the ratio of 
earnings per share to total assets; SIZE is calculated as a logarithm of total assets; 
LEV is calculated as the ratio of total debt to total assets; ΔREV changes in revenues 
from year t-1 to year t, which is a proxy for growth opportunities.
Table 2: (continued)
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Results of Estimated BTDs
We estimate ABTDs and NBTDs by using panel data. As shown in Table 3 (Panel 
A), all coefficients are significantly different from zero except for ∆INV. The 
adjusted R2 is 0.54, consistent with the notion that a large proportion of the BTDs 
is caused by mechanical or economic differences. These results differ from some 
published studies (Tang & Firth, 2011). In the Chinese context, they find that 
adjusted R2 is 0.79. This can be explained by the difference between accounting 
and tax system of the two contexts.
Table 3
Panel A: Estimated coefficient from BTDs
BTDs REV PROF INV LagBTDit it it it it it0 1 2 3 4T Tb b b b b f= + + + + +  (4)
Coefficients P-value
∆REV 0.030 0.080*
PROF 0.098 0.000***
∆INV 0.004 0.892
LagBTDs 0.364 0.000***
Adjusted R2 0.54
Sample 224
Note:  In Panel A, ***, **,* denotes the significance of one-tailed test at the level of 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10.
Variable definitions: 
BTD = reported book-tax differences in year t; 
ΔINV = changes in investment in the sum of gross property, plant and equipment in year t, which is a proxy for 
investment growth; 
ΔREV = changes in revenues from year t-1 to year t, which is a proxy for economic growth;
PROF = is a binary variable equal to one if the firm reports positive pre-tax income and zero otherwise;
LagBTDs = reported book-tax differences in year t-1; 
All variables are scaled by average total assets except for PROF.
Analysis of Conservatism, BTDs and ABTDs Evolution Over the Period of 
2005–2012
Figure 1 reports the evolution of accounting conservatism in Tunisia financial 
statements over the period 2005–2012. Figure 1 reveals that there has been a 
decrease in the accounting conservatism in Tunisia since 2006 and 2010. Bad news 
is reflected rapidly in earnings. This variation is due to financial instability in the 
period of 2010/2011 Tunisian revolution. 
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Figure 1. Evolution of accounting conservatism 2005–2012
Figure 2 reports the evolution of BTDs in Tunisia financial statements over 
the period 2005–2012. We show a volatile variation, the overall trend is on the 
increase and declining. Figure 2 reveals that there has been an increase in the 
BTDs since 2006 then by a decrease since 2008. Indeed, in 2009 average BTDs is 
equal to 0.025 and 0.014 in 2012. This variation in BTDs could be explained by 
the mechanical differences between the accounting system and the tax system, or 
from earnings management activities.
Figure 2. Evolution of total book-tax differences 2005–2012
Figure 3 reports the evolution of ABTDs in Tunisia financial statements over the 
period 2005–2012. The general trend in this figure is an increase in the ABTDs 
from the early 2008 and 2011 followed by a sharp decrease in 2012. This variation 
is explained by the extent of opportunistic practices made in order to lessen the 
maximum income tax expense.
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Figure 3. Evolution of abnormal book-tax differences 2005–2012
Descriptive Statistics And Univariate Analysis
Table 4 provides summary statistics for accounting conservatism, BTDs, NBTDs 
and ABTDs. With regard to our main conservatism measure, C-score, we find that 
the mean value is 2.610 and the median value is 2.481. Our results are higher 
than those of Khan and Watts (2009) (mean = 0.105 and median = 0.097). Two 
reasons are possible. The first is relative to difference between contexts. Second, 
our C-score is only for 2005–2012 but Khan and Watts measure C-score from 1963 
to 2005. Francis et al. (2013) found also that results of the C-score are higher than 
those of Khan and Watts (2009) and the value is much closer to that of Khan and 
Watts (2009).
The average book-tax difference level is 1.4% with minimum BTDs of 
–30.7% and a maximum of 16.30%. The discrepancy between the minimum and 
maximum values is considerably high, denoting large heterogeneity in the firms’ 
reporting gap.
The analysis of control variables shows that leverage (LEV) owns on 
average 50.2% in the capital of Tunisian firms. It reveals that most Tunisian listed 
companies have a high level of debt. Sales growths (∆REV) attain an average rate 
of 8.14%, while performance (ROA) is of an order of 5.6% of total assets.
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Table 4
Descriptive statistics 
Variables Mean Min Max SD Median
C-score 2.610 2.134 5.283 0.483 2.481
BTDs 0.014 –0.307 0.163 0.061 0.019
ABTDs .0004 –0.130 0.116 0.041 –0.002
NBTDs 0.013 –0.177 0.098 0.045 0.030
SIZE 18.112 15.489 21.197 1.008 17.959
LEV 0.502 0.081 0.977 0.200 0.524
ROA 0.056 –0.316 0.179 0.067 0.055
∆REV 0.081 –0.420 1.464 0.175 0.065
Note: C-scoreit (dependent variable) designates the conservatism level of firm i in year t; BTD is 
computed by determining the difference recorded between the pre-tax book income and the taxable 
income; NBTDs represent the estimated values, in cross sections, of the BTDs’ corresponding 
Equation (4); ABTDs abnormal BTDs residual estimated from Equation (4); ROA is the ratio of 
earnings per share to total assets; SIZE is calculated as a natural logarithm of total assets; LEV is 
calculated as the ratio of total debt to total assets; ΔREV is calculated in terms of current year net 
sales, as reported on the income statement, minus the previous year net sales. 
Correlation Analysis
Table 5 shows Spearman correlations between main variables used in our analysis. 
As expected, we find that BTDs and NBTDs are negatively, but insignificantly 
correlated with the C-score. Only ABTDs are significantly negatively correlated 
with the C-score. 
We test for multicollinearity in the regressions by calculating variance 
inflation factors and condition indices. All of the VIFs are under 2, suggesting that 
multicollinearity does not appear to be a potential problem.
Panel Data Tests 
Fixed effects test
To test the presence of individual effects in three models, check whether the 
specification of the generating process data is homogeneous or heterogeneous. The 
result of this test is a statistical Fisher presented in Table 6.
According to this table, the Fisher test proves to be significant at the 1% 
threshold with respect to both regressions, thus confirming the individual fixed 
effects.
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Table 5
Correlation matrix
Panel B (Equation 5)
C-score BTDs SIZE LEV ROA ∆REV VIF
C-score 1
BTDs –0.094
(0.160)
1 2.50
ROA –0.028
(0.673)
0.771
(0.000***)
1 2.69
∆REV 0.042
(0.525)
0.195
(0.003***)
0.205
(0.002***)
1 1.14
LEV 0.520
(0.000***)
–0.337
(0.000***)
–0.407
(0.000***)
0.214
(0.001***)
1 1.67
SIZE 0.734
(0.000***)
–0.070
(0.296)
–0.046
(0.493)
0.084
(0.208)
0.442
(0.000***)
1 1.28
Notes: C-Scoreit designates the conservatism level of the firm i in year t; BTD is computed by determining the 
difference recorded between the pre-tax book income and the taxable income; ROA is the ratio of earnings per 
share to total assets; SIZE is calculated as a natural logarithm of total assets; LEV is calculated as the ratio of total 
debt to total assets; ΔREV is calculated in terms of current year net sales, as reported on the income statement, 
minus the previous year net sales. *, **, *** denote significant differences from zero at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, 
respectively.
Panel C (Equation 6)
C-score NBTDs SIZE LEV ROA ∆REV VIF
C-score 1
NBTDs –0.104
(0.119)
1 1.84
ROA –0.028
(0.673)
0.516
(0.000***)
1 2.04
∆REV 0.042
(0.525)
0.322
(0.000***)
0.205
(0.002***)
1 1.15
LEV 0.520
(0.000***)
–0.170
(0.010***)
–0.407
(0.000***)
0.214
(0.001***)
1 1.67
SIZE 0.743
(0.000***)
–0.087
(0.194)
–0.046
(0.493)
0.084
(0.208)
0.442
(0.000***)
1 1.27
Notes: C-Scoreit designates the conservatism level of the firm i in year t; NBTDs represent the estimated values, 
in cross sections, of the BTDs’ corresponding equation (4); ROA is the ratio of earnings per share to total assets; 
SIZE is calculated as a natural logarithm of total assets; LEV is calculated as the ratio of total debt to total assets; 
ΔREV is calculated in terms of current year net sales, as reported on the income statement, minus the previous 
year net sales. *, **, *** denote significant differences from zero at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively.
Book-Tax Differences and Accounting Conservatism
131
Hausman specification test
The results of the Hausman test are shown in Table 6.
The probability of the chi-squared test is less than 10% for both models (5) 
and (6) which allows us to reject the null hypothesis and to promote our regression 
fixed effect models. Against by, for the model (7), there is a probability of chi 
square, which is greater than 10%. This allows us to accept a random effects model.
Heteroscedastic test
To check if the error variance is not constant in our data, we use the Breusch- 
Pagan test. The result of this test is a statistical Fisher. Thus, the null hypotheses of 
this test indicate the absence of heteroscedasticity problem.
Table 6 reveals that the Breush Pagan test appears to be noticeably 
significant at the 1%,  which means the heteroscedasticity of these models.
Autocorrelation test
For three models, the auto correlation error test is conducted through the Wooldridge 
test. We can conclude that the residual is auto-correlated. We correct this problem 
through the Generalised Least Squares method.
Table 6
Results of tests on panel data
Tests Fixed Effects test Specification test Heteroscedastic test Autocorrelation test
Fisher test Hausman test Breush Pagan test Wooldridge test
Equation 5 9.42
(0.000)***
24.20
(0.000)***
308.92
(0.000)***
13.115
(0.001)***
Equation 6 12.10
(0.000)***
14.45
(0.000)***
274.94
(0.000)***
16.523
(0.000)***
Equation 7 11.21
(0.000)***
8.57
(0.127)
332.40
(0.000)***
10.170
(0.003)***
Notes: *** denotes significant differences from zero at 0.01 level.
C-scoreit = α0 + α1BTDsit + α2ROAit + α3SIZEit + α4LEVit + α5∆REVit + εit  (5)
C-scoreit = α0 + α1NBTDsit + α2ROAit + α3SIZEit + α4LEVit + α5∆REVit + εit (6)
C-scoreit = α0 + α1ABTDsit + α2ROAit + α3SIZEit + α4LEVit + α5∆REVit + εit  (7)
C-Scoreit (dependent variable) designates the conservatism level of firm i in year t; BTD is computed by 
determining the difference recorded between the pre-tax book income and the taxable income; NBTDs represent 
the estimated values, in cross sections, of the BTDs’ corresponding equation (4); ABTDs abnormal BTDs residual 
estimated from equation (4); ROA is the ratio of earnings per share to total assets; SIZE is calculated as a natural 
logarithm of total assets; LEV is calculated as the ratio of total debt to total assets; ΔREV is calculated in terms 
of current year net sales, as reported on the income statement, minus the previous year net sales. *, **, *** denote 
significant differences from zero at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively.
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Regression Analysis
We first test how BTDs affects accounting conservatism as measured by C-score. 
The results of our regressions are shown in Table 7. 
Table 7
Linear regression results
Variables
Panel B (Equation 5) Panel C (Equation 6) Panel D (Equation 7)
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
BTDs –1.37 0.001*** – – – –
NBTDs – – –0.071 0.116 – –
ABTDs – – – – –0.835 0.014**
ROA 0.875 0.010*** 0.088 0.741 0.203 0.404
SIZE 0.159 0.000*** 0.170 0.000*** 0.161 0.000***
LEV 0.386 0.000*** 0.316 0.000*** 0.371 0.000***
∆REV –0.036 0.503 –0.029 0.503 –0.076 0.262
Wald
Prob > chi2
285.58
(0.000)***
368.76
(0.000)***
205.73
(0.000) ***
Notes: C-Scoreit (dependent variable) designates the conservatism level of firm i in year t; BTD is computed by 
determining the difference recorded between the pre-tax book income and the taxable income; NBTDs represent 
the estimated values, in cross sections, of the BTDs’ corresponding equation (4); ABTDs abnormal BTDs residual 
estimated from equation (4); ROA is the ratio of earnings per share to total assets; SIZE is calculated as a natural 
logarithm of total assets; LEV is calculated as the ratio of total debt to total assets; ΔREV is calculated in terms 
of current year net sales, as reported on the income statement, minus the previous year net sales. *, **, *** denote 
significant differences from zero at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively.
The results, as shown in Table 7, indicate that a negative and significant association 
between BTDs and accounting conservatism. This result is significant at the 
p = 0.001 levels. This finding is in agreement with (Tang & Firth, 2011; Hanlon, 
2005; Lev & Nissim, 2002; Blaylock et al., 2011) findings which showed a negative 
association between BTDs and earnings quality. Furthermore, Revsine et al. (2005) 
state that BTDs represent a potential danger signal that should be investigated, 
because it might be an indication of deteriorating earnings quality. These results 
prove the critical usefulness of accounting information and tax information for 
shareholders and stakeholders. In addition, accounting conservatism has been 
manifested at various levels of verification, for the purpose of recognising and 
deciphering the ‘good’ news from the ‘bad’ ones in financial statements (Basu, 
1997). Indeed, one could well testify and document a negative impact of BTDs 
on this proxy of earnings quality. Watts (2003) argues that as the links between 
financial and tax reporting increase, conservatism will also increase as departures 
from conservatism will have unfavorable tax consequences.
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Concerning panels B and C, and on using the Tunisian context related 
data, we consider it useful to separate BTDs into normal BTDs (NBTDs) and 
abnormal BTDs (ABTDs) components. Thus, based on Table 7 (panel B), the 
regression results prove to reveal that the normal differences (NBTDs) do appear 
to negatively affect accounting conservatism (α = –0.071, p = 0.116). However, 
the findings of the current study do not support the previous research by Tang and 
Firth (2012). They found that these mechanical differences could as well include 
low earnings persistence. Besides, this negative connection between the NBTDs 
and the accounting conservatism might as well lead investors to be confronted with 
book income that could appear to be less conservative and little informative on 
the firm’s potential profitability prospects. In a Tunisian context, Bouaziz Daoud 
and Ali Omri (2011b) shown that NBTDs have a negative impact on earnings 
persistence. 
With respect to panel C, Table 7 shows that ABTDs affect negatively and 
significantly (α = –0.835, p = 0.014) accounting conservatism. This result indicates 
that firms with large ABTDs are associated with lower accounting conservatism.
This finding supports previous research into this brain area which links 
ABTDs and earnings quality (Huang & Wang, 2013; Tang & Firth, 2012; Blaylock 
et al., 2011; Hanlon, 2005). Huang and Wang (2013) found that firms with large 
temporary differences are associated with lower earnings persistence. In fact, 
whenever ABTDs increase, accounting conservatism tends to decrease and, 
subsequently, information asymmetry and earnings management would seem to 
increase. The findings of the current study are consistent with those of Tang and 
Firth (2012) who found that firms with large positive and negative ABTDs exhibit 
less earnings persistence compared to firms with small ABTDs.
This result may be explained by the fact that firms that engage in more 
earnings management and tax management exhibit less accounting conservatism 
level. There are, however, other possible explanations. Our context is characterised 
by an accounting system which offers maneuver for managers in the choice of 
accounting policies and a tax system that gives wide latitude in tax management. So, 
this negative correlation is explained by the existence of accounting manipulations 
which result lower accounting conservatism.
As for the control variables, Table 7 shows that (SIZE) has a positive and 
significant effect on accounting conservatism. In fact, the large firms are assumed 
to be more conservative than small firms. The findings of the current study are 
consistent with those of (Lafond & Watts, 2008; Khan & Watts, 2009) who, 
affirming that according to the political costs hypothesis; large firms usually tend 
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to implement accounting conservatism to a higher level than small firms. Table 7 
indicates that (LEV) has a positive and significant effect on accounting conservatism. 
This result corroborates with Khan and Watts (2009) who established the existence 
of a positive association between leverage and accounting conservatism.
The results, as shown in Table 7, indicate that (ROA) has a positive effect 
on accounting conservatism. This result is significant at the p = 0.01 levels. There 
was a negative correlation between growth (∆REV) and accounting conservatism. 
The results of this study indicate that growth firms are more susceptible having 
less informative accounting information. Similarly, Ahmed et al. (2002) found that 
growth opportunities affects negatively accounting conservatism because sales 
growth may positively affect either accruals or the market’s expectation of future 
growth reflected in accounting conservatism (Sun & Liu, 2011).
Additional Test
The effect of Tunisian revolution on the relationship between book-tax 
differences and accounting conservatism
The Tunisian revolution period was characterised by some economic troubles 
which may affect financial institutions’ behaviours with respect to the cost of 
debt. This period was also characterised by the weakness of the economic and 
financial systems and more critically the problem of trust between the different 
economic agents: managers, investors, and banks (Achek & Gallali, 2015). In 
this sub-section, we provide supplemental tests on how BTDs affects accounting 
conservatism before Tunisian revolution.
To ensure that the results are not affected by this event, we first construct 
dummy variable “Revolution” which equals 1 if the study period is after 2010 and 
0 otherwise. We then interact Revolution with BTDs. The results are summarised 
in Table 8.
We find that the coefficient of BTDs, which captures the effect of book-tax 
differences on accounting conservatism for firms, is –3.507 and is significant at the 
1% level. The interaction term between Revolution and BTDs, which captures the 
incremental effect of BTDs on accounting conservatism for firms post revolution, is 
–3.890 and is significant at the 1% level. Hence, the impact of BTDs on accounting 
conservatism is much more pronounced for firms after the revolution.
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Table 8
The effect of revolution on the relationship between book-tax differences and accounting 
conservatism
C-scoreit = α0 + α1BTDsit + α2Revolutionit + α3BTDsit * Revolutionit + α4ROAit + α5SIZEit + 
α6LEVit + α7∆REVit + εit (8)
C-scoreit = α0 + α1NBTDsit + α2Revolutionit + α3NBTDsit * Revolutionit + α4ROAit + α5SIZEit 
+ α6LEVit + α7∆REVit + εit (9)
C-scoreit = α0 + α1ABTDsit + α2Revolutionit + α3ABTDsit * Revolutionit + α4ROAit + α5SIZEit 
+ α6LEVit + α7∆REVit + εit (10)
Variables
Equation (8) Equation (9) Equation (10)
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
BTDs –3.507 0.000***
NBTDs –1.775 0.038**
ABTDs –1.931 0.010**
Revolution 0.114 0.039** 0.056 0.365 0.065 0.261
BTDs*Revolution –3.890 0.000***
NBTDs*Revolution –0.861 0.503
ABTDs*Revolution –4.462 0.002***
ROA 1.546 0.005*** –0.646 0.234 0.753 0.094*
SIZE 0.163 0.000*** 0.183 0.000*** 0.180 0.000***
LEV 0.418 0.005*** 0.435 0.009*** 0.462 0.004***
∆REV –0.027 0.849 –0.039 0.804 –0.126 0.406
Wald 
Prob>Chi2
211.11
(0.000)***
123.25
(0.000)***
156.54
(0.000)***
Notes: C-Scoreit (dependent variable) designates the conservatism level of the firm i in year t; BTD is computed 
by determining the difference recorded between the pre-tax book income and the taxable income; NBTDs 
represent the estimated values, in cross sections, of the BTDs’ corresponding equation (4); ABTDs abnormal 
BTDs residual estimated from equation (4); Revolution equals 1 if the study period is after 2010 and 0 otherwise; 
ROA is the ratio of earnings per share to total assets; SIZE is calculated as a natural logarithm of total assets; 
LEV is calculated as the ratio of total debt to total assets; ΔREV is calculated in terms of current year net sales, 
as reported on the income statement, minus the previous year net sales. *, **, *** denote significant differences 
from zero at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively.
We also interact Revolution with NBTDs and ABTDs. The result, as 
shown in table 8, indicate that the coefficient of NBTDs, which captures the effect 
of normal BTDs on accounting conservatism for firms after the revolution, is 
–1.775 and is significant at the 5% level. The interaction term between Revolution 
and NBTDs, which captures the incremental effect of normal BTDs on accounting 
conservatism, is negative –0.861 but insignificant.
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Consistent with our expectation, we find in Table 8 that the interaction 
term between ABTDs and Revolution is negative –4.462 and significant at the 1% 
level. This result may be explained by the fact that firms continued in engaging 
in more earnings management and exhibit less conservative earnings after the 
revolution. Achek and Gallali (2015) found that economic and political troubles in 
Tunisia have reduced creditors’ confidence in audit quality and in earnings quality.
Our results could provide a possible explanation for why some firms after 
the revolution are less conservative in their financial reporting.
Overall, it seems that legal and political changes in Tunisia have slightly 
influenced the negative association between BTDs and accounting conservatism.
Other measures of accounting conservatism
In this section, we use another alternative measure of accounting conservatism to 
show the robustness of the documented relationship between BTDs and accounting 
conservatism.
We use the accruals-based model in Ball and Shivakumar (2005) builds on 
the decomposition of earnings into cash flows and accruals. The Ball/Shivakumar 
(2005) model1 is considered to be useful for robustness tests and when return data 
is not available.
Results are reported in Table 9. As shown the table, the coefficient of 
BTDs*CF*D is negative and significant (–2.214 with p-value of 0.025). This result 
is consistent with that found for other accounting conservatism measure, especially 
Khan and Watts (2009). There was also no increase of accounting conservatism 
associated with NBTDs and ABTDs. The coefficient of NBTDs*CF*D is –5.478 
and is significant at the 1% level. This coefficient becomes significant for this 
measurement than for a measure of Khan and Watts (2009). This result can be 
explained by the large differences between accounting rules and tax rules.
We find also that the coefficient of ABTDs*CF*D is –7.173 and is 
significant at the 1% level, indicating our result is robust to an alternative measure 
of accounting conservatism.
Overall, the results in this table are consistent with the findings of prior 
studies that firms with a high BTDs level set will be less conservative.
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Table 9
Other measures of accounting conservatism
ACC CF D D CF BTDs D BTDs
CF BTDs D CF BTDs
it it it it it it it it
it it it it it it
0 1 2 3 4 5
6 7
b b b b b b
b b f
= + + + + + +
+ +
Variables
Equation (11) Equation (12) Equation (13)
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
D 0.001 0.865 0.004 0.710 –0.013 0.337
CF –0.930 0.000*** –0.939 0.000*** –0.839 0.000***
D*CF –0.005 0.935 0.045 0.627 –0.149 0.176
BTDs 1.066 0.000***
D*BTDs –0.346 0.014**
CF*BTDs 0.542 0.405
D*CF*BTDs –2.214 0.025**
NBTDs 0.722 0.000***
D*NBTDs 0.397 0.095*
CF*NBTDs 4.441 0.004***
D*CF*NBTDs –5.478 0.006***
ABTDs 0.415 0.050**
D*ABTDs 0.186 0.586
CF*ABTDs 2.657 0.053*
D*CF*ABTDs –7.173 0.005***
Wald
Prob>Chi2
1896.04
(0.000)***
1117.63
(0.000)***
696.36
(0.000)***
Notes: ACCit is the total accruals scaled by average total assets (net income minus operating cash flows); CFit: 
Cash flows from operations in t scaled by average total assets; Dit: indicator variable equals one if CFit is negative 
and zero otherwise; BTD is computed by determining the difference recorded between the pre-tax book income 
and the taxable income; NBTDs represent the estimated values, in cross sections, of the BTDs’ corresponding 
Equation (4); ABTDs abnormal BTDs residual estimated from Equation (4); *, **, *** denote significant 
differences from zero at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of the current study was to determine the nature of the relationship 
associating BTDs and accounting conservatism. Previous studies revealed that 
BTDs are associated with poor earnings quality (Tang & Firth, 2012; Blaylock 
et al., 2011; Heltzer, 2009; Hanlon, 2005; Lev & Nissim, 2004; Joos, Pratt, & 
Young, 2002).  We provide an alternative method for partitioning total book-tax 
differences, into NBTDs and ABTDs using a residual model, to provide additional 
meaningful information about accounting conservatism. 
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This study has shown that firm-years with large BTDs have lower 
accounting conservatism. Our evidence also indicates that in the case where 
accounting conservatism is measured by Khan and Watts’ (2009) model; only 
opportunistic sources of BTDs are responsible for low accounting conservatism. 
But, in an additional test, when we use Ball and Shivakumar’s (2005) measure of 
conservatism both regulatory and opportunistic sources of BTDs are responsible 
for low accounting conservatism. This finding provides an important caveat to 
researchers and investors when they interpret large BTDs as a surrogate for low 
earnings quality that is due only to management opportunism Tang and Firth 
(2012). This confirms the assertion of Plesko (2004) who indicates that the 
increase in BTDs suggests that the link between tax and financial reporting may 
have declined, leading to less financial conservatism.
The evidence from this study suggests that both of the regulatory and 
opportunistic BTDs sources are revealed to help market participants better 
understand and assess the earnings quality from different dimensions.
This work contributes to existing knowledge BTDs by providing 
importance and quality of information transmitted by those differences. BTDs are 
a signal of “bad news” for investors because they show a poor earnings quality. 
This study helps also the regulators to improve accounting rules and 
tax rules. The empirical results of this study provide an answer to the question 
that has always been asked about maintaining connectivity or the option for the 
disconnection between accounting and taxation. The regulators may know the 
bad consequence of the disconnection between accounting and taxation. For this 
they tend to improve the accounting rules and tax rules to achieve the connection 
between accounting and taxation.
Several limitations to this pilot study need to be acknowledged. The 
sample size is small for generalising the results. We can use other measures of 
accounting conservatism (e.g. Basu, 1997; Givoly & Hayn, 2000) then compare 
with measurements of Khan and Watts (2009) used in this study.
Further research might explore the relationship between BTDs and 
earnings quality taking into account the quality of the external auditor.
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NOTES
1. The model is expressed by the following piecewise-linear regression equation:
ACC CF D D CFit it it it it it0 1 2 3b b b b f+ + + + +  
where ACCit is the total accruals scaled by average total assets (net income minus 
operating cash flows); CFit: Cash flows from operations in t scaled by average total 
assets; Dit: indicator variable equals one if CFit is negative and zero otherwise.
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